1. Moore’s Fourth Condition
   Journal of the History of Philosophy (forthcoming)

   I offer a revised historical and philosophical account of Moore’s famous proof of an external world. Drawing on unpublished archival material, I argue that what many see as the proof’s failure—its apparent circularity—stems from unresolved tensions in Moore’s own evolving epistemology of proof.

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2. Bergmann’s Intuitions
   Canadian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)

   My contribution to a workshop on Michael Bergmann’s Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition held at Arizona State University on December 7, 2024. I raise some worries about Bergmann’s use of intuitions in combating skepticism.

   (draft down for revisions)

3. Making Sense of Stebbing and Moore on Common Sense
   In A. Coliva and L. Doulas (eds.), Susan Stebbing: Analysis, Common Sense, and Public Philosophy, Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

   I argue that Stebbing’s account of common sense was both more distinct from and more indebted to Moore than scholars recognize. I then go on to develop Stebbing’s view that common sense is a form of probable knowledge—indispensable to and deeply intertwined with science.

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4. Philosophical (and Scientific) Progress: A Hinge Account
   In S. Goldberg and M. Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy, Oxford University Press (forthcoming) (with Annalisa Coliva)

   We argue that philosophy progresses much like science—despite deep disagreements—because many disputes remain evidence-responsive within shared intra-theoretical frameworks.

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5. Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement
   In M. Baghramian, J. A. Carter, and R. Rowland (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, Routledge (2024) (with Annalisa Coliva)

   We distinguish two ways in which one may be led to skepticism about philosophy. We then introduce an alternative, hinge-theoretic account that promises to recover philosophical knowledge while preserving optimism about philosophical progress.

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6. What Philosophical Disagreement and Philosophical Skepticism Hinge On
   Synthese (2022) 200: 1–14 (with Annalisa Coliva)

   We argue that pervasive disagreement in philosophy—often taken to motivate skepticism about philosophical knowledge—can be reconciled with the possibility of such knowledge.

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7. Against Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense
   Analysis (2021) 81: 207–215 (with Evan Welchance)

   We argue that Bryan Frances’s argument to the effect that philosophy can overturn common sense fails. We then go on to present Frances with a dilemma.

   PDF • YouTube

8. A Puzzle About Moorean Metaphysics
   Philosophical Studies (2021) 178: 493–513

   I introduce the idea of negative Moorean facts—negative existentials that have the status of Moorean certainties—and show how they complicate certain approaches to settling existence debates.

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Miscellany

In Progress