Publications

Edited Volume

1. The Philosophy of Susan Stebbing
   

   Oxford University Press (forthcoming; co-edited with Annalisa Coliva)

   This is the first volume to be dedicated exclusively to the philosophy of Susan Stebbing (1885–1943). Through fourteen, previously unpublished essays, this book traces and explores the depth and breadth of Stebbing’s philosophical contributions across a diverse range of issues in analytic philosophy—from logic and science, to public philosophy and politics—and reinforces the importance of Stebbing’s place in that history as well as the saliency of her ideas to issues still under dispute today.

Articles

2. A Puzzle About Moorean Metaphysics
   

   Philosophical Studies (2021) 178: 493–513

3. Against Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense
   

   Analysis (2021) 81: 207–215 (with Evan Welchance)

4. What Philosophical Disagreement and Philosophical Skepticism Hinge On
   

   Synthese (2022) 200: 1–14 (with Annalisa Coliva)

Book Chapters

5. Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement
   

   In M. Baghramian, J. A. Carter, and R. Rowland (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, Routledge (2022) (with Annalisa Coliva)

   
   

In Progress

Dissertation

1. Proof and Circularity, Reconsidered

   The overwhelming consensus among commentators is that G.E. Moore’s proof of an external world is a circular failure: whether its intended target is the skeptic or the idealist, Moore’s belief that he has hands fails to be independent of his belief that there is an external world. Drawing on archival evidence and overlooked passages in Moore’s posthumously published lectures, my dissertation, Proof and Circularity, Reconsidered, challenges this consensus in several unprecedented ways. First, I show that Moore was deeply engaged with the problem of circular proof, anticipating and responding to such worries as early as 1927/28. Second, I argue that Moore and some of his most vehement critics are, surprisingly, in agreement: his proof is circular, but only relative to an audience of skeptics (not idealists, his intended target). Third, I demonstrate that when properly reconceived, Moore’s proof isn't obviously circular against certain idealist views. What results is a new, deeper, and more contextually faithful reading of Moore’s proof, one that resolves various longstanding exegetical issues that have puzzled commentators since the proof’s publication in 1939.
   
   [For a longer dissertation abstract, click here.]

Other Projects

2. Making Sense of Moore and Stebbing on Common Sense

   Moore is known for championing a “common sense” view of the world. But his appeals to common sense can seem dubious—what exactly is common sense anyway? The aim of this paper is to demystify these appeals to common sense and clarify Moore’s overall common sense picture. I start with Susan Stebbing—a close colleague of Moore’s whose contributions have been overlooked in the literature—and use her conception of common sense to sharpen and develop Moore’s own.

3. Of Tables and the Atomic Theory: Susan Stebbing on Ordinary Language and Scientific Language

   The goals of this paper are twofold. The first is to provide an account of how Stebbing conceived of the relationship between ordinary language and scientific language (especially in her Philosophy and the Physicists [1937] and “Some Puzzles about Analysis” [1938/39]). The second is to explore Stebbing’s relationship to ordinary language philosophy (OLP) as a whole. The historiography here is underdeveloped and has mostly gone unquestioned (later Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Austin are thought to be its main protagonists). I argue, however, that Stebbing’s work may have prefigured some of the argumentative strategies thought to be characteristic of OLP.

4. A paper on hinge epistemology, philosophical disagreement, and scientific disagreement (with Annalisa Coliva)

   [Abstract coming soon; to appear in S. Goldberg and M. Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy, Oxford University Press]

5. Pedantry and Poetry: The Clashing Philosophical Styles of Moore and Bradley

   It’s all too common to hear that the clash between British idealism and Moore and Russell’s “New Philosophy” was entirely epistemological in nature: idealist views are untenable, contradictory, and incoherent. But is this not just another myth of history? Using Moore and Bradley as a case study, I attempt to reconceive the history of early analytic philosophy as a clash between philosophical styles. Reflected in the distinct writing styles of Moore and Bradley, for example, are two different ways of doing philosophy: one piecemeal, particular, and pedantic, the other holistic, sweeping, and poetic. What can this clash of styles tell us about the early history of analytic philosophy? What can it tell us about how analytic philosophy is practiced today?

6. Waismann’s Visions

   In his “How I See Philosophy” (1968), Friedrich Waismann articulates a striking view of philosophy, albeit one involving two incompatible pictures: a therapeutic picture and a linguistic picture. Baker’s (1971) solution is to conceive of Waismann’s linguistic approach as of a piece with his therapeutic approach: describing the grammar of our language is an exercise of freedom. However, I argue that Baker’s reading fails to appreciate the true pluralism of Waismann’s view. I offer a competing reading. On my reading of Waismann, the philosophical projects of Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and even the skeptic, are just as “therapeutic” as the linguistic approach Waismann is partial to; that is, they are all attempts at seeing aright because they are all articulations of philosophical “freedom” and “vision,” which, according to my reading of Waismann, are all attempts at a therapeutic cure.