I’m currently a PhD student in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. I’m advised by Annalisa Coliva.
I work in epistemology, the history of analytic philosophy (especially G.E. Moore and Susan Stebbing), and metaphysics, but this work often overlaps with issues in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mathematics, and the philosophy of science.
I did my MA in Philosophy at Brandeis University. Before Brandeis, and before finding my way to philosophy, I worked as an art writer and editor in New York. And before that, I received a BFA in Studio Art from the School of the Art Institute of Chicago.
Against Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense
Analysis (with Evan Welchance) (forthcoming)
Many philosophers think that common sense knowledge survives sophisticated philosophical proofs against it. Recently, however, Bryan Frances has advanced a philosophical proof that he thinks common sense can’t survive. Exploiting philosophical paradoxes like the Sorites, Frances attempts to show how common sense leads to paradox and therefore that common sense methodology is unstable. In this paper, we show how Frances’s proof fails and then present Frances with a dilemma.
A Puzzle About Moorean Metaphysics
Philosophical Studies (2021) 178: 493–513
Some metaphysicians believe that existence debates are easily resolved by trivial inferences from Moorean premises. This paper considers how the introduction of negative Moorean facts—negative existentials that command Moorean certainty—complicates this picture. In particular, it shows how such facts, when combined with certain plausible metaontological principles, generate a puzzle that commits the proponents of this method to a contradiction.
A paper on philosophical skepticism and disagreement
(with Annalisa Coliva)
A paper on Susan Stebbing and G.E. Moore
A book chapter on philosophical disagreement
(with Annalisa Coliva)
A book chapter on Susan Stebbing’s philosophy of science
A paper on Moore’s “Proof of an External World”
A paper on Mooreanism in metaphysics