I’m currently a PhD candidate in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine.

My primary research interests are in the history of analytic philosophy, but I also have interests in contemporary epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language. Overall, my work is driven by a desire to understand the relationship between our ordinary beliefs and the demands and doubts that philosophy is thought to impose on them.

I did my MA in Philosophy at Brandeis University and my BFA in Studio Art at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago. In between those degrees, before finding my way to philosophy, I worked as an editor and writer in New York, mostly writing about art influenced by the internet.

Email • CV • PhilPeople • Teaching

Publications

Edited Volume

The Philosophy of Susan Stebbing

Under contract with Oxford University Press (co-edited with Annalisa Coliva)

This is the first volume to be dedicated exclusively to the philosophy of Susan Stebbing (1885–1943). Through fourteen, previously unpublished essays, this book traces and explores the depth and breadth of Stebbing’s philosophical contributions across a diverse range of issues in analytic philosophy—from logic and science, to public philosophy and politics—and reinforces the importance of Stebbing’s place in that history as well as the saliency of her ideas to issues still under dispute today.

Articles & Book Chapters

What Philosophical Disagreement and Philosophical Skepticism Hinge On
Synthese (2022) 200: 1–14 (with Annalisa Coliva)
Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement
In M. Baghramian, J. A. Carter, and R. Rowland (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, Routledge (2022) (with Annalisa Coliva)
Against Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense
Analysis (2021) 81: 207–215 (with Evan Welchance)
A Puzzle About Moorean Metaphysics

Philosophical Studies (2021) 178: 493–513

In Progress

Dissertation

Proof, Reconsidered

By undoing several historiographical distortions surrounding Moore’s infamous “Proof of an External World” (1939), my dissertation shows how a number of interpretive puzzles can be resolved, clarifying and deepening our understanding of this elusive classic of analytic philosophy.

Other Projects

Making Sense of Moore and Stebbing on Common Sense
Moore is known for championing a “common sense” view of the world. But his appeals to common sense can seem dubious—what exactly is common sense anyway? The aim of this paper is to demystify these appeals to common sense and clarify Moore’s overall common sense picture. I start with Susan Stebbing—a close colleague of Moore’s whose contributions have been overlooked in the literature—and use her conception of common sense to sharpen and develop Moore’s own.
A paper on Susan Stebbing and Ordinary Language Philosophy
A paper on Friedrich Waismann’s “How I See Philosophy”