Publications

Edited Volume

1. Susan Stebbing: Analysis, Common Sense, and Public Philosophy
   

   Oxford University Press (2025) (co-edited with Annalisa Coliva)

   Susan Stebbing (1885–1943) was a pivotal figure in early analytic philosophy. Our volume, the first to be devoted exclusively to Stebbing’s philosophy, aims to bring her back into focus, showing why she mattered then and why she matters now.

   PDF (cover)

Journal Articles

1. Moore’s Fourth Condition
   

   Journal of the History of Philosophy (forthcoming)

   I offer a revised philosophical and historical account of Moore’s famous proof of an external world. Drawing on unpublished archival material, I argue that what many see as the proof’s failure—its apparent circularity—stems from unresolved tensions in Moore’s own evolving epistemology of proof.

   PDF

2. What Philosophical Disagreement and Philosophical Skepticism Hinge On
   

   Synthese (2022) 200: 1–14 (with Annalisa Coliva)

   We argue that pervasive disagreement in philosophy—often taken to motivate skepticism about philosophical knowledge—can be reconciled with the possibility of such knowledge.

   PDF

3. Against Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense
   

   Analysis (2021) 81: 207–215 (with Evan Welchance)

   We argue that Bryan Frances’s argument to the effect that philosophy can overturn common sense fails. We then go on to present Frances with a dilemma.

   PDF • YouTube

4. A Puzzle About Moorean Metaphysics
   

   Philosophical Studies (2021) 178: 493–513

   I introduce the idea of negative Moorean facts—negative existentials that have the status of Moorean certainties—and show how they complicate certain approaches to settling existence debates.

   PDF

Book Chapters

1. Making Sense of Stebbing and Moore on Common Sense
   

   In A. Coliva and L. Doulas (eds.), Susan Stebbing: Analysis, Common Sense, and Public Philosophy, Oxford University Press (2025)

   I argue that Stebbing’s account of common sense is both more distinct from and more indebted to Moore than scholars recognize. I then go on to develop what I call Stebbing’s unity thesis: the view that common-sense knowledge and scientific knowledge form a unified whole.

   Note: An earlier version of this paper was uploaded to PhilPapers on January 22, 2025, and may have circulated. This is the correct version. The most substantive changes are in Sections 4 and 5, where Stebbing’s unity thesis is introduced. Please contact me before citing.

   PDF

2. Philosophical (and Scientific) Progress: A Hinge Account
   

   In S. Goldberg and M. Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy, Oxford University Press (forthcoming) (with Annalisa Coliva)

   We argue that philosophy progresses much like science—despite deep disagreements—because many disputes remain evidence-responsive within shared intra-theoretical frameworks.

   PDF

3. Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement
   

   In M. Baghramian, J. A. Carter, and R. Rowland (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, Routledge (2024) (with Annalisa Coliva)

   We distinguish two ways in which one may be led to skepticism about philosophy. We then introduce an alternative, hinge-theoretic account that promises to recover philosophical knowledge while preserving optimism about philosophical progress.

   PDF

Miscellany

• What Moore’s Hands Mean
  

  I clarify why Moore’s proof invokes two hands, rather than one.

  Note: I won’t publish this, though feel free to cite.

  PDF

In Progress

• A paper on Stebbing’s philosophy of science
  

  (promised to Synthese)

• Another paper on Stebbing’s philosophy of science
• A paper on Moore’s paradox
• A paper on the historiography of Moore’s proof
• A paper on Locke and regulative epistemology
  

  (promised to Locke Studies; with Nathan Ballantyne)