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Research

AOS History of Analytic Philosophy • Epistemology • Metaphysics • Philosophical Methodology
AOC Aesthetics • Philosophy of Language • Philosophy of Science

Education

- 2023 (exp.) University of California, Irvine, Ph.D. in Philosophy
Dissertation: *Remaking Moore: Essays on Moore's Metaphilosophy*
Committee: Annalisa Coliva (Chair), Anna Boncompagni, Duncan Pritchard, Thomas Kelly (Princeton)
My dissertation aims to systematize Moore's thought beyond his "common sense" metaphilosophy. I argue that Moore's metaphilosophy is best understood as a form of naturalism and that this naturalism helps clarify and deepen our understanding of his most influential philosophical maneuvers.
- 2018 Brandeis University, M.A. in Philosophy
- 2011 School of the Art Institute of Chicago, B.F.A. in Studio Art

Publications

BOOKS

- 2023 (exp.) *The Philosophy of Susan Stebbing*
Under contract with Oxford University Press (co-edited with Annalisa Coliva)

ARTICLES

- 2021a [A Puzzle About Moorean Metaphysics](#)
Philosophical Studies 178: 493–513
- 2021b [Against Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense](#)
Analysis 81: 207–215 (with Evan Welchance)
- 2022a [Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement](#)
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement (with Annalisa Coliva)
- 2022b [What Philosophical Disagreement and Philosophical Skepticism Hinge On](#)
Synthese 200: 1–14 (with Annalisa Coliva)

In Progress

Proof in Parts: Understanding Moore's Elusive Proof
Proof and Circularity Reconsidered
Making Sense of Moore and Stebbing on Common Sense
Questions with and without Method: Moore, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Quine
What Moore's Hands Mean (under review)
Slurs and the Dual Copula

Presentations († ≡ Invited)

Aug 2022	Proof, Circularity, and Certainty The 5th TiLPS History of Analytic Workshop
Apr 2022	What Moore's Hands Might Mean The Ohio Philosophical Association 2022 Annual Meeting The 15th Annual Mark L. Shapiro Graduate Philosophy Conference @ Brown University The 24th Annual Rocky Mountain Philosophy Conference @ UC Boulder
Aug 2021	Susan Stebbing: The Other Cambridge Common Sense Philosopher Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference
Jan 2021	The Cogtweeto Philosophy Workshop Series
May 2021	What Moore Did† The Philosophy Club @ UC Irvine
Feb 2021	Against Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense (with Evan Welchance) The 66th Annual Florida Philosophical Association
Sep 2020	Moorean Modesty in Metaphysics Australasian Postgraduate Philosophy Conference
July/Aug 2020	Reading Ontology Off Of Language Syracuse Graduate Philosophy Conference
Oct 2019	The 80th Annual Virginia Philosophical Association Conference
Nov 2018	A Puzzle About Moorean Metaphysics The 3rd Johns Hopkins University Graduate Philosophy Conference

Teaching († ≡ Upper Division)

As Primary Instructor

	UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE
Sum 2021	Puzzles and Paradoxes
	BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
Sum 2017	MTEL Prep: Reading and Writing (Education Program)

As Graduate Student Instructor

	UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE
Wtr 2023, Sum 2020	Introduction to Philosophy
Fa 22, Spg 20, Wtr 19	Puzzles and Paradoxes
Sum 2022, Wtr 22	Skepticism and Relativism†
Spg 2022	Contemporary Moral Problems
Fa 2021	Image Collision (Art History)
Spg 2021	Modern Art in Europe and America (Art History)
Wtr 2021, Fa 20	Introduction to Ethics
Fa 2019	Nonexistence and Indeterminacy†
	BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
Spg 2018	Aesthetics
Spg 2018	Civil Liberties (Legal Studies)
Fa 2017	Introduction to Philosophy
Sum 2017	Critical Reading in the Humanities & Social Sciences (Gateway Scholars Program)
Spg 2017, Fa 16	Philosophy of Law
Spg 2016	Environmental Ethics
Fa 2015	Human Rights
	HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Sum 2016	Introduction to Philosophy

Pedagogical Training & Other Teaching

Fa 2018	Humanities Pedagogical Certificate Program (UC Irvine)
Wtr 2019	TH!NK: Philosophy for Early Adolescents (UC Irvine)
Sum 2016	Guest Lecture: "The Metaphysics of Time" (Harvard)
Fa 2015	ESL Reading and Writing Tutor (Brandeis)

Awards and Scholarships

2022	School of Humanities Research Funding Award
2018–20	Conference Travel Award (×4), University of California, Irvine
2018–19	Regents' Fellowship, University of California, Irvine
2015–18	Merit Scholarship, Brandeis University
2015	Writer-in-Residence, PBS/Art21, New York
2014	Young Art Writer's Fellowship, CUE Art Foundation, New York
2007–11	Merit Scholarship, School of the Art Institute of Chicago

Service

Referee

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

University of California, Irvine

Sum 2022	Speaker, Wonder Philosophy
	Conference Poster Design, Trust, Distrust, and Forgiveness
Spg 2022, Spg 21	Research Assistant, Annalisa Coliva
Spg 2021	Course Assistant, Katherine Ritchie
2018–21	Creator and Organizer, Epistemology Reading Group
2020–21	Advisor, UCI Philosophy Club
Wtr 2019	Conference Assistant, M. Oreste Fiocco, SCMN Inaugural Conference
Fa 2018	Creator, Graduate Work in Progress Series
	Brandeis University
2016–17	Graduate Student Representative
Fa 2016	Organizer, Preparing for the PhD Workshop Series
2015–16	Creator and Organizer, Metaphysics Reading Group

Graduate Coursework (* ≡ Audit)

History of Analytic Philosophy

UC IRVINE	Wittgenstein's <i>Philosophical Investigations</i> * (Annalisa Coliva & Anna Boncompagni)
	Independent Study: J.L. Austin (Allison Koslow)
	Independent Study: G.E. Moore (Annalisa Coliva)
	Independent Study: Susan Stebbing (Annalisa Coliva)
	History of Analytic Philosophy: Part II (Jeremy Heis, LPS)
	History of Analytic Philosophy: Part I* (Jeremy Heis, LPS)
TUFTS	The Philosophy of W.V.O. Quine (Jody Azzouni & Jeff McConnell)

Epistemology, Metaphysics, & Mind

UC IRVINE	Penelope Maddy's <i>A Plea for Natural Philosophy</i> * (Jim Weatherall & Allison Koslow)
	Independent Study: Hinge Epistemology (Duncan Pritchard)
	What Is This Thing Called "Philosophy"?* (Annalisa Coliva)
	Independent Study: Philosophical Disagreement (Annalisa Coliva)
	The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics (M. Oreste Fiocco)
	Transcendental Arguments* (M. Oreste Fiocco)
	Extended Rationality (Annalisa Coliva)

	Reduction, Emergence, & Fundamentality (M. Oreste Fiocco)
	Nature of Reality (Kourosh Saberi, Cognitive Sciences)
UCSB	Easy Epistemology (Daniel Z. Korman)
BRANDEIS	Metaphysics (Eli Hirsch)
	Theory of Knowledge (Berislav Marušić)
	Empiricism and the Epistemology of Modality (Jennifer Marušić)
	Knowledge and Skepticism (Jonathan Vogel)
	Personal Identity (Eli Hirsch)
	Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (Jennifer Marušić)
	Philosophy of Mind (Jerry Samet)
TUFTS	Metaphysics (Jody Azzouni)
	Logic, Language, Mathematics, & Science
UC IRVINE	Modal Logic (Ermanno Bencivenga)
	Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism* (Kyle Stanford, LPS)
BRANDEIS	Independent Study: Modal Logic (Eli Hirsch)
	Mathematical Logic (Jennifer Marušić)
	<i>Naming and Necessity</i> (Eli Hirsch)
	The Infinite (Palle Yourgrau)
	Topics in Logic Conditionals* (Jennifer Marušić)
	Formal Semantics: Truth, Meaning, and Language* (Sophia Malamud, Linguistics)
	Mathematical Methods in Linguistics* (Keith Plaster, Linguistics)
TUFTS	Proof in Mathematics (Jody Azzouni)
	Social Philosophy & Value Theory
UC IRVINE	Nature of Social Kinds* (Katherine Ritchie)
	Anti-Racism (Karl Schafer & J.B. Manchak)
	Money* (Aaron James)
	Meaning of Life* (Jeffrey Helmreich)
	Speech Ethics (Aaron James)

Dissertation Abstract

My dissertation, *Remaking Moore: Essays on Moore's Metaphilosophy*, aims to “remake” Moore—not in the characteristic image of a “common sense” philosopher, but in the image of a naturalist. I argue that embedding Moore’s work within this naturalistic framework not only helps clarify and deepen our understanding of his most influential philosophical maneuvers, but also helps debunk some common misperceptions about them.

Some of Moore’s philosophical maneuvers can seem baffling. His appeals to common sense can seem quaint and parochial: why should a philosophical theory’s *failure* to conform with common sense count against it? What is common sense anyway? And his flatfooted, two-handed attempt at proving the external world can seem dogmatic and naive—how could Moore possibly think it’s *that* easy?

In my dissertation I demystify these appeals to common sense and clarify Moore’s overall common sense picture. I start with Susan Stebbing—a close colleague of Moore’s whose contributions have been overlooked in the literature—and use her conception of common sense to sharpen and develop Moore’s own. Against what is, unequivocally, the received view, I argue that common sense is, as Moore and Stebbing conceive it, more Quinean than Archimedean: although our common sense beliefs enjoy more centrality in our “web of beliefs” than scientific ones, they’re an extension of such beliefs and, hence, just as corrigible—importantly, however, they’re just as evidential. This fundamentally shifts the way Moore’s “credibility comparisons” should be understood: not as an indefeasible appeal to common sense over abstract philosophy, but as a defeasible appeal to the best evidence we currently have on offer, i.e., empirical experience.

I also explain how exactly empirical experience comes to constitute “proof” for Moore, especially as it features in his “Proof of an External World” (1939). I develop what I call the *dual-aspect* reading of Moore’s proof: that his proof should be taken literally and straightforwardly, as an empirical proof—differing in degree but not in kind from “proving,” for example, that there exist black ravens—but also non-literally, as a *metaphilosophical* rejection of a certain “transcendental” approach to philosophy. The dual-aspect reading not only resolves a number of longstanding interpretive puzzles, but also accounts for why the proof is simultaneously perceived as both a success and failure. The proof is *successful* because Moore has genuine empirical knowledge of an external world and this knowledge is compatible with lacking the sort of “transcendental” proof or evidence that his skeptical and idealist opponents demand. Yet, in another sense, the proof fails, not for any of the usual reasons (that it begs the question or is circular), but because Moore fails to make explicit his metaphilosophical commitments.

In foregrounding Moore’s methodological commitments in this way—his naturalistic “metaphilosophy”—my dissertation helps explain the puzzlement many face when confronted with Moore’s maneuvers. Moore emerges as a figure interested in both (i) bringing to light the tensions between our everyday, empirical ways of investigating the world and the demands and doubts the philosophical method is thought to impose on them, and (ii) circumscribing the limits and scope of what the philosophical method, and philosophy more generally, can achieve. In this respect, Moore has much more in common with Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine than commentators have previously assumed. Developing Moore’s metaphilosophy can therefore help us better appreciate the method behind Moore’s seemingly mad naivety.